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0. Introduction.
The main thrust of the self-interest theory of regulation, as proposed by
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), is that regulations develop as the result of
demands from different interest groups for governmental intervention. There is no
necessary divergence between politicians' optimal policies (as responses to
interest groups demands) and their implementation. Policies, however, are seldom
implemented directly by the politicians themselves. Instead, these are delegated
to regulatory agencies, departments, or the courts. In this paper I expand the
self-interest theory of regulation to account for the potential agency problems
between Congress and its regulators, and subject the implications of the agency
part of the framework to a preliminary empirical test.
Agency problems between politicians and regulators arise because regulators'
actions are intrinsically unobservable . Thus, Congressional (or Presidential)
delegation of regulatory authority generates agency discretion. Regulators, then,
may pursue interests not aligned with those of the politicians that appoint them. 1
This insight has not gone unobserved to students of the political economy of
regulation. Two main approaches have developed. One, coined the "Congressional
Dominance" hypothesis, while recognizing the potential agency problems between
Congress and its regulators, essentially assumes that Congressional instruments are
powerful enough to fully control its regulators. 2 The other approach, embeded in
1 Throught this paper I will assume that Congressional interests are well
defined. This assumption would hold, if, as is going to be the case here, the
policies of the regulatory agency are unidimensional . If policies were
multidimensional, then, Congressional interests may not be well defined, and
delegation of regulatory authority may in itself provide substantial scope for
regulators pursuing their own interests. On this issue see Hammond, Hill and Miller
(1985).
2 While implicit in Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), this assumption
appeares explicitly, among others, in Weingast (1984) and Weingast and Moran
(1983). See Moe (1985) for a critique of the Congressional Dominance hypothesis.
the naive capture or bureaucratic theories of regulation, implicitly assumes that
agency problems are so accute that bureaucracies can work independently of
Congressional or Presidential desires. 3 In this paper these two approaches are
seen as particular (corner) solutions to a more general agency problem, where
politicians and interest groups compete to influence regulators' decisions. 4
In this paper I focus on Congressional delegation of regulatory authority. 5
While the interests of Congressmen and interest groups are related, they do not
necessarily coincide. The electoral connection (e.g. Mayhew (1974)) suggests that
Congressmen take into account the electoral consequences of their actions.
Congressmen's interests, then, are related to those of a multiplicity of groups.
Some may provide support through campaign contributions, while others may provide
the necessary electoral support. Unless fully aligned with a particular interest
group, Congressmen will not pursue the interests of a single group. Interest
groups, then, can influence regulatory outcomes through two channels. Indirectly,
through the electoral connection, and directly, trying to influence the regulators
Hence, Congress and interest groups will usually compete for regulators' favors.
While the Congressional Dominance hypothesis deals, naturally, with the role of
Congress in the implementation of regulatory policy, this approach can be extended
to other political institutions (e.g. the relation between the President and the
department secretaries)
.
3 See, for example, Niskanen (1971), or Clarkson and Muris (1981).
* The unobservability of regulators' actions implies that regulators may shirk
for two reasons. First, since regulators may dislike effort, they may shirk so as
to reduce their effort. On the other hand, the existence of an interest group not
perfectly aligned with politicians' interests implies that interest groups will
(implicitly or explicitly) offer compensation to the regulators for shirking. In
this paper I assume the existence of such an interest group.
5 It should be clear from the outset, however, that a more complete analysis
should take into account the role of the President in the appointment and control
processes. For a discussion of this issue see Calvert, et al (1987), and references
therein
.
The competition for regulators' favors has several implications for the
development of regulatory policies. First, since regulatory policies have non
trivial agency costs, 6 Congressmen will balance those costs against the political
benefits in assessing whether to undertake a certain regulatory policy. Second,
competition between Congress and interest groups implies that even if Congress'
interests were exclusively aligned with a single interest group (e.g. their direct
constituency) , the implementation of regulatory policies would take other interests
into account. 7 This feature of the "agency" model presented here is what generates
many of the results associated with the "self-interest" approach (e.g. regulators
cross - subsidize in a fashion similar to that in Peltzman (1976); they mitigate
changes in Congressional demands for regulatory policies, 8 and may make regulatory
policies more "pro- industry" in recessions and more "pro-consumers" in booms). 9
The "agency" framework developed here has however particular implications for
optimal regulatory budget policies and for the career path of bureaucrats which
differentiates it, empirically, from the political self-interest framework. This
6 The agency costs discussed here are different from the costs involved in
regulating a firm with private information (e.g. Baron and Myerson (1979)). These
costs arise even in the absence of an "agency" problem between Congress and its
regulators
.
7 By assuming away the discrepancies in objectives between Congress and
regulators, the traditional Congressional dominance approach imposes on regulators
an objective function which is characterized by some weighted average of consumer
and producer interests (e.g. Peltzman (1976). See also Ross (1985) for a method,
and applications, to estimate the regulators' utility function weights.). In
contrast, the regulatory framework developed here endogenously determines the
regulator's implicit weights.
! See Weingast and Moran (1983) for a Congressional dominance model with a
similar implication.
9 Changes in regulatory policy are, here, only partially the result of
changes in Congressional desires. They represent, rather, changes in the incentives
faced by regulators. Congress, however, knowing those incentives, chooses its
optimal policies accordingly.
model predicts that to contraint regulators' actions regulatory budgets must fall
following unfavorable outcomes for Congress. 10 A second set of empirical
implications is related to the career path of bureaucrats. Because of the
competition between Congress and industry, it is shown that regulators command
rents. Competition for regulators' jobs, then, implies rent dissipation. Since
Congressmen can be seen as appointing regulators, Congressmen should be able to
extract those rents from potential regulators. 11,12 Congressmen may collect the
proceeds of the bidding process in the form of campaign or staff work, or in direct
monetary contributions. Limits on campaign contributions, however, implies that
"working" for Congressmen may be the most common form of rent dissipation. Most
regulators, then, should have some public sector experience. Similarly, since
interest groups should compensate regulators, the "agency" framework predicts that
a "high" percentage of regulators should eventually have post-commission jobs
related to the regulated industry.
Finally, since agency costs increase when interest groups can influence
10 This result formalizes the "fire alarm" approach suggested, among others,
by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
11 While in principle, the President appoints Commissioners, Senate oversight
committees have to approve the appointments. Thus, Congressmen have substantial
power to determine the pool from which potential appointees can be drawn.
12 In what follows I assume that Congress can be represented as a single
agent. This assumption requires some discussion. First, since I analyze regulatory
policy as single dimensional, committee majority rule would provide the rationale
for this assumption. If, however, regulatory policies were multidimensional, then
this assumption would not be sufficient to generate uniqueness of equilibrium. On
the other hand, if Congress controls regulators through committees, then this
assumption requires either some measure of coordination across congressional
committees, or that committees do not represent specialized constituencies. While
committee members are able to capture regulators' rents through patronage, Congress
as a whole has to agree to finance the agency's budget. Thus, unless committee
members are drawn from a random distribution of Congressmen (which they are not)
,
some coordination among committees will be required to assure Congressional
approval of the regulators' budgets.
regulators' decisions, Congress could limit the extent by which interest groups can
influence regulatory outcomes. I present conditions, however, under which Congress
prefers to allow interest groups direct influence on regulatory decisions. 13 While
allowing interest groups to influence regulators reduces the extent of regulatory
control, interest groups' influence may actually increase Congress' overall benefit
from the regulatory process by increasing regulators' rents which are appropiated
by Congressmen. In this sense, interest groups' influence on the regulatory
process may be seen as indirect contributions to Congressmen.
1. The Model.
Consider a three players game: Congress, the interest group (which for
convenience will be called the industry), and the regulator. The model here
attempts to capture a situation where Congressmen's interests are aligned with
those of a diffuse but electorally important interest group (call them consumers).
Because of being a diffuse group, it is not able to directly influence the
regulator's actions. Its influence, however, is achieved indirectly through
electoral support for Congressmen. Industry, on the other hand, while being a
concentrated group may not be able to provide much electoral support. 14,15 Thus,
13 Recent public discussion of the "revolving door" at different governmental
agencies, has raised the question of whether Congress should further restrict
post-governmental employment for senior government executives, which would impose
stricter limits on the ability of interest groups to influence the design and
implementation of regulatory policies. See GAO (1986).
14 This model assumes away direct influence of industry on Congressmen. A more
general model, would allow industry to make contingent transfers to Congressmen as
well, which could take the form of contingent (or retrospective) campaign
contributions. If campaign contributions must be designed in a way similar to
industry' transfers to the regulators, this extra layer of agency problem may not
substantially change the nature of the problem, since there will still be a need
for direct industry transfers to regulators.
15 This paper assumes that industry is able to solve its free-rider problem in
making transfers to regulators.
its effect on regulatory outcomes is achieved through directly influencing the
regulator's incentives.
Congress' and industry's payoffs are functions of the regulator's actions. The
regulator's actions are unobservable , but they affect the distribution of the
industry price, p, which has a binary distribution with values {p L ,ph ). The
probability of observing a low price (p L ) is given by <f>(x) , where x is the
unobservable action (effort) taken by the regulator. 16 Let <£'(x)>0. Congress is
assumed to prefer a low price, while industry prefers a high price. Given the form
of the probability function, Congress' (industry's) preferences are increasing
(decreasing) in x. Let Congress' preferences be given by consumer surplus minus
the regulator's budget, and industry's preferences by profits net of transfers. 17
Congress and industry try to influence the regulator's choice of x. Congress'
sole instrument is assumed to be the regulator's budget, which can be made
contingent on the observed price. 18 Similarly, industry's single instrument is a
direct transfer to the regulator which may also be contingent on the observed
16 In this model x is unobserved by both Congress and industry. This
assumption could be relaxed by letting industry have better information about x
than Congress (e.g. industry could observe a signal of x) . While this assumption
would make the model more realistic, it would increase its complexity without
adding substantial new insights.
17 This paper uses as an example price regulation. The model, however, is
more general. The regulator could be thought of as regulating pollution, or safety
in the workplace. The main requirement in this model is that Congress' preferences
should not coincide with those of the interest group. Notice also, that since
budgets enter into Congressmen's preferences, the opportunity cost of a dollar is
exactly one. Thus, there is a real utility cost for Congressmen in providing large
budgets to their regulatory agencies.
18 The budget concept that I use here is the discretionary rather than the
operational budget. The latter should also impact regulatory efficiency. That is, <f>
could, in principle, depend on the level of operational budget. Here it is assumed
that
<f> depends only on the regulator's action x.
19price
.
For any set of budgets and industry transfers, the regulator chooses the
optimal action x, which in turn determines his expected utility. I will assume
that the regulator's utility function is increasing in budgets and transfers and
decreasing in the action x (effort), and it is further separable in budgets, effort
and income (i.e. industry's transfers).
The timing of the game between Congress, industry and the regulator is as
follows. First, Congress decides whether to allow industry transfers to the
regulator. While in principle, Congress could choose an optimal tax on industry's
transfers, for simplicity I assume here that Congress either allows or prohibits
transfers. 20 If industry transfers are allowed, then Congress makes public a
budget offer to • the regulator, which relates the budget transfer to the realized
price. Observing that offer, industry chooses its best transfer offer, which also
relates industry transfers to the realized price. Based on those offers the
regulator decides on an unobservable action, x. Following the regulator's action a
price is observed. Budgets and transfers follow.
Congress' optimal strategies (including its decision to prohibit industry
transfers) are derived anticipating the optimal industry offer to the regulator, as
19 Industry transfers could take, for example, the form of post -government
employment. While I restrict industry's influence instrument to direct transfers,
regulated industries may also use other methods to influence regulators.' Owen and
Breautigam (1978) analyze how regulated industries use administrative procedures to
influence regulatory outcomes. In particular, by threatening to obstruct regulatory
proceedings, the regulated industry may be able to provide incentives to the
regulator to undertake favorable regulatory actions.
20 Different regulatory agencies impose different restrictions on senior
executives' post-agency employment. For example the Federal Researve Board allows
Board members to take industry jobs as long as they completed their full seven
years term. Other commissions, however, have less stringent requirements. Below, I
discuss the rationale for Congressional choice of different post-agency employment
restrictions
.
well as Che optimal choice of x by the regulator. Similarly, industry's optimal
transfer is calculated taking into account the optimal response by the regulator. 21
Congress and industry can then be seen as two principals trying to influence a
single agent (the regulator). In this paper principals' strategies are
constrained. In particular, budgets and transfers cannot be negative. Also, the
equilibrium concept used here requires the principals to choose optimal sequential
strategies, with Congress moving first.
Congress' strategies must satisfy the regulator's individual rationality
constraint. That is, the regulator's utility must at least exceed his (known)
reservation level. Industry's choice, on the other hand, only takes into account
the optimal choice of x by the regulator as a function of both Congress' and
industry's offers. 22 Since industry benefits from no participation by the
regulator, Congress must make sure that its offer provides the regulator enough
utility to make his participation worthwhile for all feasible industry offers. 23
The following assumptions are used throughout:
(Al) WB>0, Wx<0, WBB<0, WBx=0, and Wxx<0
,
(A2) ^'(x)>0, 0"(x)<O, 0(O)=O,
(A3) AU = U
L
-Uh > t^-ttjl = All > 0;
where U
. ,
j=l,h, represents Congress' utility from Pj , n- , j=l,h, is the industry
profit derived from a price p., and W(B,x) + T represents the utility of the
21 This model, then, captures parts of the multiple-principals/single -agent
framework in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and the hierarchy framework developed in
Tirole (1986). See also Baron (1985) and Ferejohn (1986) on multiple principals.
22 The equilibrium must also provide the principals with utility and profit
levels above their non-participation levels. These constraints are assumed to be
satisfied at the equilibrium.
Alternatively, by withdrawing its transfer offer industry could force the
regulator to choose not to participate, increasing industry's expected profits.
regulator receiving a budget of B, a transfer of T and performing the action x
.
24
Finally, when performing comparative statics with this model the following
assumptions will be made for computational simplicity:
(A4) 0''(x)=O,
<A5) Wjbb-0,
2. Statement of The Game.
When Congress allows industry transfers to the regulator, then the solution to
the game played by Congress, industry and regulators is as follows:
The equilibrium is a triple (B.T.x), with B=(B 1 ,Bh ), T=(T 1 ,Th ), such that
x = argmax (0(y) [W(B 1 ,y)+Tj + (l-0(y) ) [W(Bh , y)+Th ] } ; (RP)
(y)
T = argmax {^(x) [t^-TJ + C W(x) ) [jrh -Th ] ) , (IP)
subject to:
x = argmax {^(y) [w(B L , y)+Tj + (l-^(y) ) [ W(Bh ,y)+Th ] } ;
and
B = argmax (^(x) [Ul-B1 ] + ( W(x) ) [Uh -Bh ] } (CP)
subject to:
x solves (RP)
,
T solves (IP)
and
tf(x )W(B lf x ) +(W(x ))W(Bh ,x ) > w*. (IR)
2U The functions W(
. ) and <f>(.) are chosen so that the first-order approach to
the principal-agent problem used here is valid. See Rogerson (1985) and Grossman
and Hart (1983) for a discussion of the problems in using the first-order approach
and the sufficient conditions that make it valid.
where x - argraax {*(y)W(B
L ,y) + ( W(y) )W(Bh ,y) ) ,
(y)
and where w* is the regulator's reservation utility level.
That is, the solution to the game consists of simultaneously solving Congress'
(CP) , industry's (IP) and the regulator's (RP) problems. The regulator's problem
(RP) consists of maximizing its expected utility subject to Congress' and
industry's offers. Industry's problem consists of maximizing its expected profits
net of transfers, subject to Congress' budget offer and the regulator's first order
condition. Finally, Congress' problem involves maximizing expected consumer
surplus net of budgets, subject to (a) the regulator's optimal choice of x for any
given set of budget and transfer offers, (b) the industry's optimal choice of
transfers for any set of budget offers, which in turn depends on the optimal
regulator's choice of effort, and (c) the regulator's individual rationality
constraint evaluated at a level of zero industry transfers.
Before analyzing the equilibrium, it is useful to determine the first-best
benchmark allocation, where industry transfers are not allowed, and where
regulator's actions are observable.
2.1. First-Best Regulatory Policy.
When no industry transfers are allowed, and x is observable, Congress'
first-best outcome is obtained by solving (CPF) below:
Max {^(x)[U
1
-B
L
]+(l-^(x))[Uh -Bh ]} (CPF)
(Bi.Bh.x)
subject to:
^(x)[W(B1 ,x)]+(l-^(x))W(Bh ,x)>w*.
Congress' first-best is given by:
Lemma 1: In the absence of industry influence in the regulatory process,
10
the first-best effort and budget allocations are given by:
(i) B
L
=Bh=B
(ii) W(B,x) = w*
(iii) W
x
(B,x)/WB (B,x) = -<^'(x)(U 1 -Uh ).
The proof of the Lemma is straightforward, and is not presented. The intuition
is the following. Since the single principal (Congress) is risk neutral while the
agent is risk averse on budgets, all risks are allocated to the principal by
providing the regulator with a constant budget. Furthermore, the regulator is
driven to his reservation level, and Congress' welfare is maximized subject to
those constraints. Consequently, the rates of substitution between effort and
budget for both Congress and the regulator are equalized.
3. Equilibrium Outcomes.
3.1. No Industry Transfers. 25
If Congress is able to restrict industry from offering transfers to
regulators, the game becomes one between Congress and the regulator. 26 It is,
then, a simple principal-agent problem. The equilibrium is then a pair (B,x),
B=(B 1 ,Bh ) , such that
x = argmax {^(x)W(B
L ,
x) + ( W(x) )W(Bh ,x) } (RRP)
(x)
B = argmax {^(x) [UL-BL]+(l-0(x) ) [Uh -Bh ] } (RCP)
{B
L
,Bh }
subject to:
x = argmax (</»(y)W(B 1 ,y) + (l-0(y) )W(Bh ,y) ) (RFOC)
25 In what follows I will refer to the "unrestricted" ("restricted") game as
that where industry is (not) allowed to make transfers to the regulator.
This would be the case if, for example, Congress could impose a life-time
ban on private employment following governmental work, and strictly control
post-agency earnings.
11
and
^(x)W(B
L ,x) + (W(x))W(Bh ,x)>w*; (RIR)
where (RFOC) and (RIR) represent the constraints involving the regulator's optimal
choice of effort and his participation decision respectively.
In the usual way, the model is solved backwards by first analyzing the
regulator's problem given in (RRP) . The first order condition for the regulator,
for any (B 1 ,Bh ), is given by
*'(x)[W(B
L
,x)-W(Bh ,x)] + Wx (Bh ,x) + Z Rx=0, x£ Rx=0 . (1)
From (1) we observe, first, that to obtain an internal solution the first term
in (1) has to be positive. Thus,
Corollary 1: In the absence of industry transfers, x>0 if and only if B L>Bh .
That is, the regulator should, in equilibrium, prefer a low to a high price
outcome. Equation (1) establishes a correspondance between x and the actual values
of Congress' budgets. The internal solution to (1) is of the form
x = x(B L ,Bh ), (2)
with xBL>0 and xBh<0 .
27
The solution to (RCP) and (RRP) (the "restricted game"), is characterized in
Lemma 2
.
Lemma 2: The solution to (RCP) and (RRP) is given by
(i) B L > Bh > 0;
(ii) If 6 < 1/WJJ, then Bh=0
;
(iii) For Bh>0, WB7wBh = - <Ml-5WBL)/[(W)(l-6WBh )] ;
(iv) 4>=0 => B
L
=0;
27 Assumptions (Al)-(A3) guarantee the signs of the partial derivatives of
x(.), with xB1-tf'W£/[*"(W 1 -Wh )+Wxx ], xBh = *'W|}/[4"(Wr Wh )+Wxx ], and
W
J
-W(B
J
,x).
12
where 5 is the lagrange multiplier associated with the regulator's individual
rationality constraint, and W^ represents the derivative of W(B,x) with respect to
B evaluated at B^ . The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to that of Lemma 3 and is not
given here.
Observe that Congress could, in principle, achieve the first-best regulatory
effort level. Expected budgets, however, would exceed the first-best levels. This
result is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: In the absence of industry transfers,
(i) the first-best level of effort is achievable if and only if
^(x*)(U 1 -Uh )WB (B*,x*) <w*-W(0,x*). (3)
(ii) Furthermore, if (3) holds, then
B* < <?i(x*)B 1 (x*) + (l-^(x*))Bh (x*),
where (B*,x*) represent the first-best combination of budget and
regulatory effort, and Bj(x*), j=l,h, represent the budget allocations
needed to implement x* in the restricted game.
The proof of Proposition 1 involves finding a pair (B 1 ,Bh ) so that x* can be
implemented as an equilibrium to the restricted game. Since, in principle B L can
be adjusted so that the regulator receives no rents, condition (3) requires that
the highest feasible punishment that Congress can impose upon the regulator (a zero
budget) should provide the regulator with a substantial relative disutility,
compared to his reservation utility level, that will motivate him to undertake the
optimal effort. Furthermore, since the regulator's expected utility equals w*,
assumption (Al) implies (ii).
3.2. Equilibrium with Industry Transfers.
When Congress is unable (or prefers not) to restrict industry's transfers to
the regulator, competition between Congress and industry develops. The difference
13
between the outcome to this game and the one where Congress prohibits industry
transfers, arises because 7r L<7rh while U L>Uh . That is, the regulatory objectives of
the two principals are contradictory. Thus, with positive industry transfers, the
regulator enjoys a utility level above his reservation level. The individual
rationality constraint in (CP) , in Section 2, is then calculated at the level of
effort that the regulator would undertake if faced with T=0 , and B=(Bh ,B 1 ). 28
We can then state,
Corollary 2: If the equilibrium involves positive transfers by industry, then
the regulator's expected utility exceeds his reservation level. 29
Let us first analyze the regulator's problem in the unrestricted game, given in
(RP) in section 2. The first order condition for the regulator, for any (B,T), is
given now by
0'(x)[W(B
1
,x)+T
L
-W(Bhl x)-Th ] + Wx (Bh ,x) +£ x=0, x£ x=0 . (4)
Observe that to obtain an internal equilibrium, the regulator must also prefer
a low price outcome to a high price one. That is,
Corollary 1.1. : x>0 , if and only if
W(B
1
,x)+T
L
>W(Bh ,x)+Th .
The equilibrium to this game (the "unrestricted game") is characterized below.
Lemma 3: The interior solution to (CP)
,
(RP) and (IP), is given by:
(i) T
L
=0, Th>0,
(ii) B^B^O,
(iii) if 6=0, then Bh=0
,
28 This level of effort (x ) is the equilibrium one only when the optimal
industry transfer is in fact T=0
.
29 This result does not imply that the individual rationality constraint in
Congress' problem is never binding at the equilibrium, since this constraint is
calculated at zero industry transfers. On this see more below.
14
(iv) 4>=0 implies Bj=0
,
1-<?S=0 implies Th=0
,
(v) EW=^(x)[W
L
-Wh -Th ]+(l-tf(x))[Wh+Th ]>w*,
with the inequality in (v) being strict when Th>0
;
where 0<5<1/Wg represents the lagrange multiplier associated with the
individual rationality constraint in Congress' problem.
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in the Appendix. The intuition behind Lemma 3 is
that both industry and Congress will try to influence the regulator to take
favorable actions. In the case of industry such an action is to undertake a low
regulatory effort. This can be achieved by making the compensation to the
regulator very large when there is a favorable outcome, (i.e. a high price), while
punishing him for unfavorable outcomes. Since we restrict transfers to be
nonnegative, the worst punishment is a transfer of zero. Thus, both Congress and
industry make low transfers in (their respective) unfavorable outcomes.
Lemmas 2 and 3 show that budget restrictions follow unfavorable outcomes, and
in the unrestricted game, are accompanied by industry transfers. Thus,
Corollary 3: Budget restrictions follow unfavorable outcomes for Congress,
and are accompanied by industry transfers.
Lemmas 2 and 3 also show that the budget and effort allocations in the
restricted and the unrestricted games are not the same. 30 It can also be seen that
for every budget offer the optimal x in the restricted game exceeds that of the
unrestricted game. The intuition is clear. In the unrestricted game, industry is
able to compensate the regulator for high price outcomes. Thus, given any offer B,
30 Substituting (B*,x*) (the solution to the unrestricted game) into (1) we
observe that the value for the left hand side of (1) is positive. Thus, (B*,x*) is
not a solution to the restricted game.
15
che regulator will tend Co provide less regulatory effort. 31 Furthermore,
Proposition 2 shows that competition between Congress and industry generates social
overexpenditure on regulation related activities.
Proposition 2: In the presence of direct industry transfers, the total monetary
expenditure on regulation exceeds the minimum required to achieve
the equilibrium regulatory outcome.
The proof is given in the Appendix. 32 Proposition 2 implies that if industry
was allowed to make direct transfers to Congress but not to the regulators, then
both industry and Congress could be made better off. Thus,
Corollary 4: If industry is not allowed to pay Congressmen directly, social
overexpenditure in regulation is an equilibrium outcome.
Observe that Corollary 4 does not say that regulatory agency budgets are
necessarily larger than optimal. Rather, total social expenditure on regulation is
above what it would be necessary if Congress and industry would coordinate their
actions. 33 Whether actual budgets increase when industry transfers are allowed
cannot be answered in general terms. 3A
3.3. Comparative Statics in the Presence of Industry Transfers.
While there are feasible corner solutions to the unrestricted game (i.e.
31 The expected budget, however, may be higher in the unrestricted game
32 See Bernhaira and Whinston (1986) for a general proof of this proposition.
In the Appendix I present a direct proof of the Proposition.
33 See Niskanen (1971) for a different overexpenditure result.
34 The presumption is that since allowing industry transfers exacerbates the
"agency" problem, Congress will try to control the regulator by offering him a
riskier lottery (that is, Congress may want to increase the difference between B L
and Bh ) . This result, while plausible, is not always correct. In section 4 I
present an example in which when the regulator's individual rationality constraint
is not binding the equilibrium budget for the restricted and unrestricted case is
the same
.
16
T=B=x=0 , or B>0 , x>0 , T=0) , here I concentrate on the internal solution to the
game. The parameters of the model are w*, 7r 1 , 7rh , U L and Uh , while the endogenous
variables are B 1? Bh , T L , Th , and x. When the individual rationality constraint is
not binding, i.e. 5=0, the interior solutions are functions of the profit
difference, AII=7rh -7r 1 , and of the consumer surplus difference, AU=U L -Uh . By fully
differentiating the first order conditions to (CP)
,
(IP) and (RP) , and holding
constant {p L ,ph }, the following comparative statics are derived:
Lemma 4: If in the solution to (CP)
,
(IP), and (RP) 5=0, then,
dB L 1 dB L W
L
B
= > 0, = > 0,
dAn [2W^-(AU-B 1 )W LBB ] dAU [2W LB -(AU-B L )W 1BB ]
dTh U\ dTh (W^) 2
= 1/2 + > 0, - > 0,
dAn 2[2WB;-(Au-B 1 )W LBB ] dAU 2 [ 2W LB - ( AU-B,_)W LBB ]
dx ^'(x)[W^-(AU-B 1 )W 1BB ] dx - ^'(x)(W LB ) 2
= < 0; = >0.
dAn 2W
xx [2wY(AU-B 1 )W LBB ] dAU 2WXX [ 2W L B - (AU-B L )W LBB ]
The proof of Lemma 4, while tedious, is straightforward and is not presented
here. It involves taking the full derivatives of the first order conditions of the
unrestricted game.
Lemma 4 has several empirical implications which are similar to those
originally developed in Peltzman (1976). 35 Here, however, these results do not
arise from the workings of Peltzman' s "political wealth effect," but rather from
competition between the two principals in an "agency" framework. First, observe
35 When 5>0, the comparative statics become much more complicated. Still it
can be shown that the following holds:
dB
L dBh dTh dx
> 0, < 0, >0, >0,
dAU dAU dAU dAU
dB
L dBh dTh dx
> 0, < 0, > 0, <0 .
dAn dAn dAn dAn
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that if the marginal utility of a dollar of budget (in the low price state) is less
than the marginal utility of a dollar of transfer (i.e. Wg<l) , then budgets,
transfers and regulatory effort are more sensitive to changes in profit
differentials (An) than to changes in consumer surplus differentials (AU) . The
rationale for this result is that if in equilibrium Wjjj<l , Congress compensates
regulators with a relatively inefficient instrument, and a marginal increase in
budgets increases regulatory effort by less than a marginal increase in transfers
(i.e. |dx/dB L | = -<f>' (x)W 1B/Wxx < -<£' (x)/Wxx-| dx/dTh | ) . That would not be the case
if Congress could make direct monetary transfers to its regulators. Thus, we can
state
:
Proposition 3: If in the solution to (CP)
,
(IP), and (RP) , W£<1 and 5=0, then,
changes in budgets, transfers and regulatory effort are more
sensitive to changes in profit differentials than to changes in
consumer surplus differentials.
Second, observe that holding constant {Pi,Ph). an increase in marginal cost
would increase the profit differential. Thus, from Proposition 3 we obtain that
the workings of the "regulatory lag" should be stronger when demand changes (i.e.
changes in AU) than when cost changes (i.e. changes in All). Observe, also, that an
increase in marginal cost reduces the extent of regulatory effort. Thus,
Corollary 5: The regulatory system dampens the effect of demand on prices,
but magnifies the effect of costs on prices.
Third, if during, booms AU increases while All falls, while the opposite holds
during recessions, 36 then Lemma 4 predicts that regulatory effort will increase
during booms and fall during recessions. The rationale for this result is that
This will be the case if during booms productivity increases while demand
functions rotate outwards becoming more elastic.
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during booms the willingness Co pay by Congress for regulatory effort increases
while it falls for industry. The opposite will hold during recessions. Thus,
Corollary 6: If AU (All) is procyclical (anticyclical) , then regulations
are oriented towards "consumer protection" during booms
and towards "producer protection" during recessions.
Finally, from Lemma 4 we obtain that the regulation of industries with low
costs will be more weighted toward "consumer protection" than that of high cost
industries. Thus, if what drives differences among regulated industries are costs
differences, then positive profits and "industry capture" will be negatively
correlated. Another implication similar to those in Peltzman (1976) relates to
Congress' incentives to regulate industries. In particular, Congress' largest
benefits from regulation arise from large demand- low cost industries. The
rationale is that the lower the industry cost, the lower the industry's profit
differential, and the smaller the agency costs of regulation. Conditioned on
Congress not being able to extract the rents from the regulators, we can state:
Lemma 5: If Congress cannot extract the regulator's rents, and if in the
solution to (CP)
,
(IP), and (RP) 6=0, then
dEU [«^'(x)] 2 [W LB -(AU-B 1 )W lBB ] <Kx)
<
dAn 2WXX [2W LB -(AU-B L )W^BB ] [2W LB -(AU-B 1 )W 1BB ]
dEU
= *(x),
dAU
where EU = *(x)(U
L -B L ) + ( l-tf(x) ) (Uh -Bh ) .
This result, however, may not follow if Congress is able to extract regulator's
rents. In particular, Lemma 6 states that if the individual rationality constraint
is not binding, then regulators' rents increase with both AU and AIT.
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Lemma 6: If in Che solution to (CP)
,
(IP) and (RP) 5=0, then
dEW W£
= (W(x))/2 + (l+*(x)) — > 0,
dAn [2W^-(AU-B
L
)W LBB ]
dEW (W£) 2
- d+0(x)) > 0,
dAU 2[2WB-(AU-B L )W LBB ]
where EW = <£(x) (W(B
L ,x) -W(Bh ,x)+T 1 -Th )+W(Bh ,x)+Th -T L .
The proofs of Lemmas 5 and 6 while tedious are straightforward and are not
presented here.
Lemmas 5 and 6 introduce the possibility that by extracting regulators' rents,
Congress' benefits from regulation increase with the opposition of industry to the
regulation (i.e. the larger the industry's profit differential). In this case,
then, Congress incentives to restrict industry transfers may fall. These issues
are analyzed next.
3.4. Bidding for Regulatory Positions.
As discussed above, if industry transfers are positive, regulators receive
rents. 37 A bidding process, then, should develop by which potential regulators
transfer all their excess rents to Congress. The transfer, however, is independent
of the actual actions the regulator takes once in the job. Thus, the bidding
process by itself has no effects on the actual equilibrium, nor on the regulator's
individual rationality constraint. 38
This result holds even when the individual rationality constraint is
binding.
J Would-be regulators are supposed to bid for their rights to become
regulators. If regulatory appointments were allocated to the highest bidder, then
the regulator that can capture the largest rent would obtain the position. Thus,
the would-be regulator with the lowest w* will obtain the position. If regulators'
utility were also a function of the regulatory outcome, then regulatory rents would
also depend on the characteristics of the utility function of the regulator.
Congress would then allocate regulatory positions on the basis of regulator's
utility functions (on a model trying to' explore this insight see McCubbins, et al.
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Combining Lemmas 5 and 6 we obtain:
Corollary 7: If potential regulators bid all their expected excess rents, then
if in the solution to (CP)
,
(IP), and (RP) , 5=0, we obtain
dEUB S^<l+*(x»-2* (l-4>) (^') 2 [WV(au -bi)w1bb]
= + + * 0,
dAII 2[2W^-(AU-B 1 )W 1BB ] 2 2WXX [ 2W1 B - (AU-B L )W LBB ]
dEUB (W^) 2
4> + (l+<f>) > 0.
dAU 2[2WE;-(AU-B 1 )W1BB ]
where EUB=EU+EW-w*.
It is then feasible that a larger profit differential (All) may actually
increase Congress' expected benefit from the regulation since if Congress extracts
regulators' rents, it will capture part of the increase in the total (political)
surplus originating from an increase in the profit differential (i.e. from an
increase in the demand for no- regulation) . Hence, Congress may find optimal not to
restrict industry transfers. The following section analyzes conditions under which
Congress may allow industry to make transfers to regulators.
4. Optimal Choice of Restrictions on Industry Transfers.
The ability of industry to make transfers to regulators has two
counterbalancing effects on Congressional benefits from regulation. On the one
hand, industry transfers exacerbate the "agency" problem between Congress and the
regulator. On the other hand, regulator's rents are larger when industry transfers
are allowed. Congress will then balance increased appropiation of regulator's
rents against a lower level of direct regulatory benefit. Thus, if the direct cost
of lower regulatory effort is too large (i.e. a large AU) then Congress should
prefer to restrict industry transfers.
If the individual rationality constraint is binding in the restricted game,
(1987)).
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however, in the absence of industry transfers there are no rents that Congress can
appropiate from the regulators. Thus, the gains from allowing industry transfers
may substantially exceed those that can be obtained when the individual rationality
constraint is not binding in the restricted game. Thus, we should expect less
restrictions on industry transfers for regulators whose reservation utility levels
are relatively high.
Proposition 4, below, shows that if Congress cannot capture the regulators'
rents, then in the absence of enforcement costs Congress will choose to prohibit
industry from making transfer offers.
Proposition 4: Under assumptions (Al)-(A5), in the absence of regulatory bidding,
the solution to (CP)
,
(IP), and (RP) implies EUR>EUU , where EUR
(EUU ) represents Congress' expected utility when industry
transfers are (not) prohibited.
The proof of the proposition is given in the Appendix. The intuition for this
proposition is clear. Industry transfers increase the cost of regulations,
reducing Congress' expected gains from regulation. This proposition has
implications for understanding the process of regulatory appointments and interest
group influence. If Congress could not extract rents from the regulators, it would
prefer to deter interest groups from directly influencing the regulatory process.
Restricting interest groups, however, may be costly. In that case, partial
restrictions may be optimal. Partial restrictions may be implemented in two
different ways. First, all regulators may be deterred equally from employment in
agency- related businesses. Alternatively, different regulatory agencies may
stipulate different restrictions. The current model provides a direct rationale
for discretional choice of post-agency employment restrictions. If the cost of
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enforcing those restrictions are independent of their benefits, 39 then agencies
where the difference between EUR and EUU is not too large should have more
permissive post-agency employment restrictions. In the example given in Section
4.1 below, the larger AU the larger the difference between EUR and EUU .^° Also,
for the same example, Table 1 shows that the larger w* the lower the difference
between EUR and EUU . Observe, also, that regulatory effort increases with AU. but
falls with w* . Thus, the industries for which it is optimal to relax post-agency
employment restrictions are also those where regulatory effort (in the absence of
industry transfers) would not have been "too" large. Allowing transfers would
further reduce the extent of regulatory effort. Thus, on average, the regulatory
process should be more "pro- industry" in cases for which Congress allows direct
industry influence. The existence of regulatory bidding, which is dealt with next,
provides a further rationale for relaxing influence restrictions.
4.1. Regulatory Bidding and Optimal Restrictions: An Example.
The purpose of this example is to present, for a specific probability and
regulatory utility functions, conditions under which Congress will allow industry
transfers when regulators' jobs are obtained through bidding.
The regulator's utility and probability functions are specified as follows:
(A6) W(B,x) = 7B - x2
,
(A7) 4>(x) = x, 0<x<l.
Also, I normalize the problem by assuming
(A8) An = 7rh - ir L = 2.
39 Enforcement costs relate to those costs incurred so as to deter industry
from making payments to regulators. These costs may involve the costs of examining
former regulators income tax returns, enforcing restrictions on post-agency
employment, etc.
tt0 This can be seen from Table 1 for the case of w*>AU/12 , and from comparing
Lemmas 2. a and 3. a, below, for the case when w*<AU/12
.
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Below I analyze the solution to the games when Congress does and does not
allow industry transfers. First, Lemmas 2. a and 3. a present the equilibria under
both regimes. Substituting assumptions (A6)-(A8) into the first order conditions
for the restricted and unrestricted games, we obtain the following results. 41
Lemma 2. a: Under assumptions (Al)-(A8), in the absence of direct industry
transfers, the equilibrium is characterized by:
x = (yB
L
-7Bh )/2, 6>( = )0 if w*>«)AU/12;
and, if 5=0, then
B
r
= AU/3, Bh = 0, EU
R
- (AU/3)7(AU/3) + Uh , EWR - AU/12; A2
where EU^CU^B^ + C l-<£) (Uh -Bh ) , and EWR=<?iW(B 1 , x) + ( W)W(Bh , x) .
Lemma 3. a: Under assumptions (Al)-(A8), in the presence of direct industry
transfers, the equilibrium is characterized by:
x=(7B
L
-yBh -Th )/2, Th=(7B 1 -yBh )/2, Tj-0, 5 C>(<)0 if w*>(<)AU/12;
and if 5 C=0, then
B
L
- AU/3, Bh - 0, EW
U
= AU/48 + 7(AU/12)>AU/12>w*
,
EUU = (AU/6)7(AU/3) + Uh ;* 3
where EU U (EWU ) represents Congress' (the regulator) expected utility in
the unrestricted case.
The proofs of Lemmas 2. a and 3. a are derived from Lemmas 2 and 3, and are not
41 See Appendix A for the first order conditions of the "unrestricted" game
The first order conditions for the restricted game can be similarly derived.
u2 If <5>0, then Bh and B L are implicitly determined by AU - 12(w*-7Bh ) +
8(w*-yBh )7(w*-yBh ) - UjRj(u*-jRh ) = 0, and, 7b l - J^+2j(w*-JZh ) .
43 If 6 C>0 then Jbh and 7b l are implicitly given by jE^jB^Jiw^-J^) ,
and AU - 12(w*-7Bh ) + 8(\r*-Jbh )J(w*-Jlh ) = 0.
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presented.
In the remainder of this section I analyze Congressional choice of
restrictions, assuming that restrictions are chosen to capture regulators' rents.
A bidding process, by which regulators bid up to their expected rents (i.e., EW-w*)
constitutes such a process. A5 The following Proposition presents the result of the
institutional comparison in the presence of regulatory bidding.
Proposition 5: Under assumptions (Al)-(A8), if regulators' jobs are obtained
through bidding, then if 5=0 (i.e. w*<AU/12) , then for AIK2.0663
EUBU>EUR .
When the individual rationality constraint is not binding, direct comparison of
EUBU and EUR from Lemmas 2. a and 3. a can be performed, showing the proposition.
The result presented in Proposition 5 can be augmented by analyzing the simulation
results presented in Table 1, columns 3 and 5. There we see that when the
individual rationality constraint is binding (i.e., w*>AU/12) , then for each AU,
there exists a W*(AU) such that for w*>W*(AU) EUBU>EUR .* 6
These results provide the strongest argument for allowing direct industry
transfers to regulators. By increasing regulator's rents, direct industry transfers
increase the amount potential regulators are willing to bid for their positions,
Ai| It is also straightforward but tedious to see that the following
comparative statics hold:
dTh/dw*>0, dBj/dw*>0, dBh/dw*<0, dEB/dw*>0 , dx/dw*>0
,
dTh/dAU>0, dBj/dAUX), dBh/dAU<0, dEB/dAU>0 , dx/dAU>0
where EB represents the expected Congressional budgetary allocation.
A5 If Congress captures the regulators' rents, then Congress' expected utility
will be given by EUB = EU+EW-w* = <^(x) [U 1 -B L ] + (l-<^(x) ) [Uh -Bh ] + ^(x)[W1+T 1 ] +
<W(x))[Wh -Th ] - w*.
A6 Observe that if there are enforcement costs, then the inequalities in
Proposition 5 should be further relaxed.
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increasing Congressmen's rents from the political process. Thus,
Corollary 10: If regulators bid for their jobs, it would be optimal for Congress
to allow industry transfers if regulators' reservation utility
level is relatively high, or the costs from a lower regulatory
effort level (AU) are relatively low.
5. A Test of the Model.
The model presented in this paper can be tested by analyzing the determinants
of the career path of bureaucrats. The main implications of the agency model
developed above are: first, Congress and industry will reward regulators for
favorable outcomes by increasing their transfers. Second, regulators' rents are
dissipated through bidding for regulatory positions. Appointments, then, take the
form of patronage. Real politics, however, are not as simple as the model in this
paper. In particular, politicians have other instruments to reward regulators for
favorable outcomes. Regulators may be appointed to more prestigious positions in
the public sector (e.g. cabinet positions), or rewarded with access to Congressmen,
increasing their general productivity. Since commissioners leave their agencies
almost every year, Congress will use all its instruments to reward and punish its
regulators. If there was a favorable outcome the commission's budget will be
increased, and those regulators that quit the agency would be provided with other
non-budgetary compensations.
Similarly, industry does not have to provide the regulator with a job to
compensate him for favorable outcomes. For example, the regulator may go to work
for a law firm, with industry channelling some of its legal work through it.
Thus, the strongest empirical implication of the model is, that, conditioned on
a regulator quitting the commission, the probability of going to work (directly or
indirectly) for the industry falls with the agency's budget during the regulator's
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last period at the agency. 47,A8
Eckert (1981) shows the typical career path for regulatory commissioners to
consist of coming to the agency with substantial previous public sector experience,
and in an important proportion leaving the commission to work (directly or
indirectly) for the industry they previously regulated. As Eckert suggests this
stylized fact cannot reject the specific-capital hypothesis, namely, that during
their tenure at the commissions, regulators acquire substancial industry-specific
capital, making an industry-related position more attractive. The specific-capital
hypothesis, however, does not share the main empirical implication of the agency
framework. In particular, if the regulator's ability is unknown to the private
sector, an augmented signaling-cum-specific-capital hypothesis would predict a
positive, rather than negative, correlation between budgets and the probability of
regulated industry jobs. A larger budget would imply that the regulator is an able
and productive manager. Since he also has acquired industry specific-capital,
larger budgets should be positively correlated wity industry jobs. 49
A second empirical implication of the model consists of the use of patronage.
Clearly not all regulatory appointments are patronage appointments. Many (and
perhaps some of the most important) regulators have had no public service
kl It is clear that the decision to quit at a given period depends (among
other things) on the available offers the regulator has received. Therefore, the
optimal quitting time and post-agency employment will be related. While a general
model that estimates simultaneously the optimal length of stay at the agency and
the optimal career choice could be developed, it is beyond the scope of this work.
48 The type of budget concept that I use is described in the data section.
49 A positive correlation between industry jobs and budgets is further
strengthened from a strategic consideration. Since industry prefers to be
regulated by inneffective regulators it may find it optimal to hire those
commissioners that turn out to be efficient regulators. Thus, if a larger budget
is a proxy for the regulator's unobserved ability, the probability of an industry
job increases with the budget.
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experience at all. The rationale for their appointment may not be to capture their
potential economic rents. For example, since politicians would benefit from
appointing regulators whose preferences are biased towards their own interests, it
is conceivable that public sector experience is a way for politicians to learn
potential regulators preferences. In that case, regulators will not be very
receptive to industry offers. Thus, the probability of obtaining industry related
jobs should be smaller for non-patronage appointments.
A third empirical implication is derived from the passing, in 1978, of a broad
government ethics bill (S. 555), imposing new restrictions on senior government
employees' post -government employment. Under the new bill former employees could
never lobby the government on matters they worked on directly, and the bill also
required a cooling off period of one or two years in which former government
employees would be restricted from contacting their former agencies. 50 Following
the passage of the ethics bill, then, industry's cost of transfers would increase.
Thus, the correlation between the probability of an industry job and budgets should
be weakened following the introduction of the Ethics bill. Furthermore, the
overall probability of an industry job should fall following the Ethics bill. 51
A test of the model consists then of estimating the determinants of the
conditional probability of a regulator working for the industry following his
tenure at the commission. While the empirical specification used here does not
provide an estimate of the structural parameters of the model, the model will not
50 The bill was first introduced in 1977, and drew substantial support in
both the House and the Senate. The Senate passed an omnibus government ethics bill
already in June 1977, but the House's proliferation of Ethics bills implied that
the final passage of the bill had to be postponed to 1978.
51 Actually, since in early 1977 it was already clear that the bill will pass
(see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Dec. 3 1977, p. 2523), the effect of
the Ethics bill should start being felt in 1977 itself.
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be supported by the data if the probability of going to work for industry does not
fall with the agency's discretionary budget during the last period of the
regulator's tenure.
The empirical model to be used is a Probit model, Prob(PostIndi=l) = F(X i /3) ,
i=l,N, where Postlnd is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the regulator's
job after the commission is directly or indirectly related to the regulated
industry; F(
.
) is the normal CDF, /3 is the vector of parameters to estimate, and X
is a vector of exogenous variables given by X = (Patronage, Age, DBudget, Ethics,
DBudget*Ethics , Other Dummies), where Patronage takes a value of one if the
regulator had public sector experience preceding his commission appointment, Age is
the age of the regulator when leaving the commission, DBudget is a measure of the
discretionary budget during the regulator's last year at the commission, Ethics is
a dummy taking a value of one if the regulator left the commission in 1977 or
later. The other dummies are described in the next section.
6. The Data.
The data set is composed of the career path of regulators for the ICC, CAB and
FCC, and a of measure of discretionary budgets.
a. Career Path of Regulators.
Most of the data on the career path of bureaucrats used here were provided most
generously by Professor Ross Eckert of Claremont College. For each regulator
Professor Eckert collected the period of his or her tenure at the commission, as
well as his/her pre- and post-agency experience. Professor Eckert 's data set
consists of all regulators that were appointed until 1978. Following a methodology
similar to Professor Eckert' s, I collected information for those commissioners that
were appointed after 1978 and that completed their work at the commissions by 1984.
I also checked and up-dated the information in Professor Eckert 's data set.
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Thus, for each regulator I have information on age, tenure at the Commission,
and pre- and post-agency experience. I created a Post- Industry dummy equal to one
if the post-agency employment of the regulator is directly or indirectly related to
the regulated industry. A direct relationship means being an employee of a
regulated firm. An indirect relationshiop means to work for a law firm that does
industry work. Similarly, I created a Patronage dummy equal to one if the
regulator's pre-agency employment was at the public sector, and a Pre-Industry
which equals one if the pre-agency employment of the regulator was directly or
indirectly related to the regulated industry.
The main requirement for a regulator to be in the sample is to have a complete
career path. Since I do not use the information on regulators that are incumbent
as of 1985 or that died in office, not all regulators in Eckert's sample are in
mine. Also, I do not include in the sample regulators for whom I was not able to
find a specific post- or pre- agency activity (whether retired or still at work).
Because of the need to have a consistent time series of discretionary budgets,
my data set includes only those regulators that left the ICC after 1932, the CAB
after 1943, and that left the FCC after 1939. 52
The data sources are multiple and are similar to those described in Eckert
(1981). Multiple issues of the following Who's Who were used: Who's Who in
America, Who's Who in American Politics, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, Who's
Who in Government. Newspapers sources were The New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, and the New York Times obituaries. The source on law firm's affiliation
52 The reason for selecting this sample is that the estimation of the budget
equation uses lagged values of budgetary appropiations . Consequently, I include CAB
and FCC regulators that left their commission not earlier than three years
following the first congressional budgetary appropiation for their commission. To
be able to have a comparable institutional framework for the three agencies, I
included only ICC commissioners that left the ICC after 1932.
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and nature of legal practice was the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (different
issues). Professor Eckert also provided me with press releases of the different
commissions listing the backgrounds of their current commissioners. The
information offices of the different agencies also provided information about some
of their previous commissioners' post-agency employment,
b. Discretionary Budgets.
For each agency I collected the annual Congressional appropiation. From this
figure I am interested in capturing the portion that is "discretionary." I define
"discretionary" as unexplained by business cycle conditions, by trends, or by
general movements in the federal civilian budget. Thus, for each agency I estimate
a basic budget equation of the following form:
Budget ti = a0i + a 1:LNonDefense t + a2iUnemployment t + a3iBudget it _ 1 +
aAiBudget it _ 2 + a 5iBudget it _ 3 + a6iTrend + a7iTrend
2 + e it , i=CAB, FCC , ICC
;
where "NonDefense" represents total federal non -defense expenditures, and "Budget"
the agency appropiation for the year. Both NonDefense and Budget are deflated by
the CPI , and are expressed in natural logarithms.
To obtain from the basic budget equation a measure of the discretionary budget
during the last year of the regulator's tenure at the commission, I estimate the
budget equation for that commission with the sample period excluding the year in
consideration. The discretionary budget for that year for a specific agency is
then defined as the (out of sample) prediction residual. To make the three time
series of discretionary budgets comparable across agencies, I normalize them by
dividing each constructed agency's time series by its standard deviation. 53
7. The Empirical Results.
53 See Table 5 for the means and standard deviation of each agency's time
series of discretionary budgets.
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Table 2 presents the distribution of regulators by agency and occupation, and
Table 3 presents the occupation matrix. Of the 129 regulators three quarters come
to the agency with public sector experience, and almost half leave to work directly
or indirectly for the regulated industry. While 49% of patronage appointments go
to work for industry following their tenure at the commission, only a third of the
regulators that come from the private sector do so. 54 There are no major
differences accross agencies, except that, in this sample, only one CAB
commissioner came from the regulated industry.
Table 4 presents the Budget equations for the three agencies. All budgets are
correlated with general non-defense expenditures, and are sensitive to general
business cycle conditions. However, while CAB's and ICC's budgets increase with
unemployment, FCC's budgets falls. There does not seem to be remaining serial
correlation of the residuals. 55 Table 5 shows the distribution of the logarithm of
discretionary budgets for the regulators in my sample. There is substantial
variation in the logarithm of discretionary budgets, and their means are not
statistically different from zero.
Table 6 presents the main empirical results. The main hypotheses being tested
are whether larger discretionary budgets and the Ethics Bill of 1978 reduce the
probability of obtaining a regulated- industry job. Different specifications are
presented, 56 trying to capture the effects of various exogenous variables.
54 Thus, as expected, this sample does not differ much from Eckert's (1981)
55 Since there are lagged-dependent variables in the right hand side,
Durbin's h test and the t-statistic for first-order serial correlation are
reported.
56
I tested whether the Probit equation can be pooled across the different
agencies. To perform the test I estimated a Probit equation where all parameters
are allowed to vary across agencies, and tested whether the restriction that all
parameters are the same across agencies can be rejected. The test is given by
-2(log(LU) -log(LR) ) where log(LR) (log(LU)) is the logarithm of the (un)restricted
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General business conditions are proxied by Che Unemployment variable; the Patronage
and Prelndustry dummies capture the regulatory selection process; the Republican
dummy captures any possible effects across different administrations; the Post- 1965
dummy captures the effect of the increase in regulations that followed the
mid-1960s; the Ethics Dummy captures the effect of the Ethics Bill of 1978; the
Female dummy captures any potential sex differences in career paths, while the
DBudget*Ethics variable captures the change in the cost of industry transfers
following the Ethics Bill.
Column 1 shows the results of estimating the Probit equation where the set of
explanatory variables does not include any of the budget variables. Patronge
appointments have a higher probability of obtaining a regulated industry job; as do
younger regulators; republican administrations seem to reduce the probability of
regulators working for the regulated industry; female commissioners go to work for
the regulated industry in much lower proportions than their male colleagues, 57 and
the Ethics bill seems to have reduced the probability of working for industry.
Column 2 presents the estimation of the Probit equation when all the variables
are included, and Columns 3 and 4 perform robustness tests by excluding selected
variables. 58 Here, increases in discretionary budgets seem to reduce the
estimation, and it is distributed as x2 (°,) i with q being the number of
restrictions. For the specification chosen the statistic was equal to 9.322, which
is smaller than the critical value for all normal confidence values. The
specification on which this test was performed did not include the unemployment,
female or the republican variables.
57 There are, though, only 7 female commissioners in my sample
58 Since columns 2 to 4 present qualitatively similar results, I will proceed
the discussion based on the results of column 2. From column 4, however, we see
that the results concerning the Ethics Bill and the Republican coefficients (but
not that of the coefficient of DBudget*Ethics) are sensitive to whether the
Post- 1965 variable are included or not. Thus, inferences about the independent role
of the Ethics Bill and of the Party should be made with caution.
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probability of going to work for the regulated industry. The effect of
discretionary budgets seems to differ following the Ethics Bill of 1978. While the
change is insignificant, it is positive, implying that the effect of discretionary
budgets may have fallen following the passage of the Ethics Bill. Macroeconomic
considerations seem to affect the decision to go to work for the regulated
industry. Finally, the probability that regulators leaving their commissions
obtain regulated industry jobs seems to be smaller during republican
administrations. This result may suggest that either Republican administrations
enforce the conflict of interest laws more stringently, or that they are able to
lure regulators with better alternative compensations, reducing industry's ability
to make transfers to regulators. 59
These results, then, suggest that discretionary budgets and post-agency
employment at the regulated industry are negatively correlated, with the
correlation being reduced following the passage of the Ethics Bill.
Congress, then, seems to have used budgets to discipline its regulators.
8. Final Comments.
In this paper I present a multiple-principals/single-agent model of regulation.
The model provides a framework to analyze Congress' incentives to regulate
industries as well as to restrict the ability of interest groups to impact upon the
outcomes of the regulatory process, and empirically testable implications different
from the traditional self-interest hypothesis. The empirical evidence provided
here does not reject the existence of an agency problem between Congress and its
regulatory agencies. While Congress seems to use its budgets to discipline
regulators, Congressional control does not seem to be perfect.
59 See, however, column 4 where this result does not hold if the Post-1965
varible is excluded.
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TABLE 1
SIMULATION RESULTS
AU w* EUBU EUU EBU EUR EBF
.2 .610 .313 .179 .626 .358
.4 .524 .204 .383 .429 .625
.6 .324 .004 .583 .149 .762
.8 .044 -.276 .863 -.191 .999
1.0 -.316 -.636 1.223 -.600 1.327
.4 .648 .318 .464 .638 .852
.6 .448 .118 .664 .328 .924
.8 .168 -.162 .944 -.033 1.136
1.0 -.192 -.522 1.304 -.458 1.448
.4 .775 .443 .506 .885 1.012
.6 .578 .245 .765 .536 1.144
.8 .298 -.035 1.045 .148 1.304
1.0 -.062 -.395 1.405 -.295 1.591
.4 .965 .632 .506 1.265 1.012
.6 .789 .465 .929 .916 1.516
.8 .505 .186 1.262 .469 1.655
1.0 .145 -.174 1.623 -.012 1.864
1.2 -.295 -.614 2.062 -.547 2.212
.4 1.092 .759 .506 1.518 1.012
.6 .944 .620 .929 1.239 1.859
.8 .652 .358 1.431 .724 2.069
1.0 .250 .000 1.999 .206 2.103
1.2 -.190 -.440 2.439 -.352 2.404
Note: EUBU = ^(U^B^ + (l-0)(Uh -Bh ) + EW-w*
EUU ,EUR = ^(U.-B,) + (l-<£)(Uh -Bh ),
where values are given by Lemmas 2. a and 3. a for the restricted and the
unrestricted case respectively.
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TABLE 2
PRE- AND POST-AGENCY EMPLOYMENT OF REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS
ICC CAB FCC TOTAL
REGULATED INDUSTRY
PUBLIC SECTOR
OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR
PRE -AGENCY EMPLOYMENT
9 1 10
32 28 36
5 6 2
20
96
13
REGULATED INDUSTRY
PUBLIC SECTOR
OTHER PRIVATE SECTOR
TOTAL
POST -AGENCY EMPLOYMENT
21 15 22
7 7 8
18 13 18
46 35 48
58
22
49
129
Source: See text
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TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT TRANSITION MATRIX
PRE -AGENCY EMPLOYMENT
POST-AGENCY
EMPLOYMENT
PUBLIC
SECTOR
REGULATED
INDUSTRY
OTHER PRIVATE
SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR 18
(.19)
REGULATED 47
INDUSTRY (.49)
OTHER PRIVATE 31
SECTOR (.32)
2
(.10)
7
(.35)
11
(.55)
2
(-15)
4
(-31)
7
(.54)
TOTAL 96 20 13
Note: Percentages are given in parentheses
Source: See text.
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TABLE 4
BUDGET EQUATIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL BUDGETARY APPROPIATION IN LOGARITHMS
ICC CAB FCC
CONSTANT -1.41 -.33
(-1.18) (-.44)
REAL NONDEFENSE .17 .22
EXPENDITURES (2.21) (3.18)
BUDGET(-l) 1.13 .88
(9.36) (5.74)
BUDGET(-2) -.35 -.03
(-1.93) (-.17)
BUDGET(-3) -.06 -.23
(-.41) (-1.51)
TREND .04 .04
(2.52) (3.03)
TREND2 -.3E-3 -.9E-3
(-2.63) (-4.13)
UNEMPLOYMENT .01 .02
(2.42) (1.71)
R-SQUARED .91 .98
D-W 2.006 1.958
DURBIN-h -.045 1.167
t-statistic -.446 .174
for AR(1)
NUMBER OF OBS . 53 42 48
Note: Ordinary least squares estimation.
1 ,17
(1 21)
.41
(3 .05)
.64
(4 • 74)
.
.14
(-1 .06)
.
.28
(-3 50)
6E-3
( .08)
.12E-3
( .79)
.
.02
(-3 .30)
.97
1 .905
.949
.443
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF DISCRETIONARY BUDGETS
ICC CAB FCC
MEAN -.01961 .00146 -.00796
STANDARD DEVIATION .09769 .08656 .10118
Source: Table 4.
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TABLE 6
PROBIT EQUATION
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REGULATORS' POST-COMMISSION
REGULATED INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT
(N-129)
CONSTANT 5.59 6.42 6.22 6.82
(2.24) (2.52) (2.46) (2.70)
PATRONAGE .50 .59 .65 .55
(1.15) (1.35) (1.48) (1.27)
PRE -INDUSTRY .02 .17 .22 .19
(.04) (.33) (.42) (.37)
LOG AGE -1.49 -1.71 -1.71 -1.78
(-2.37) (-2.65) (-2.67) (2.77)
DISCRETIONARY -.26 -.18 -.27
BUDGET (-1.75) (-1.44) (-1.83)
DBUDGET*ETHICS .21 .31
(.62) (.92)
ETHICS BILL -.54 -.47 -.52 -.05
(-1.43) (-1.21) (-1.36) (-.15)
POST-1965 .62 .61 .64
(1.99) (1.90) (2.03)
REPUBLICAN -.37 -.33 -.36 -.11
(-1.40) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-.44)
UNEMPLOYMENT -.01 -.03 -.03
(-.34) (-.90) (-.92)
FEMALE -1.18 -1.16 -1.13 -1.14
(-1.76) (-1.67) (-1.66) (-1.66)
LOG LIKELIHOOD -80.02 -78.41 -79.01 -80.27
PERCENTAGE .620 .628 .604 .643
CORRECT
Note: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
< T 6 >
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3:
Industry first order conditions are given by (A.l):
(A. la) xT1<?i' [7r L -T 1 -7rh+Th ] - <f> + fn =0, £ T iT l=0 •
(A. lb) xft*'[»r1.-T1-*h+Th ] - (1-tf) + £ Th = 0, £ ThTh=°.
where xT1=-<£' /Wxx , and Xxh=<^ ' /^xx are derived from the regulator's first order
conditions. Equations (A.l) imply Tj=0 , since for an internal solution AH>Th -T L .
That B L>Bh>0 can be derived from the first order conditions for Congress which are
given in (A. 2)
.
(A. 2a) -<£' 2 [AU-B
L
+Bh ]WB
L /(2w
xx )
-
<f> [ I - S <f>°/^ ] + £ BL - 0, Ui*i~<> >
(A. 2b) 0' 2 [AU-B 1+Bh ]w£ /(2WXX ) - (1-tf) [1-SW* (l-*°)/(W) ] + £ Bh = °. $^\=°
Rearrenging (A. 2a) and (A. 2b) we obtain W^<Wg
,
implying B L>Bh . Observe that as
long as Th>0, B 1>Bh , since <j>°><f> for Th>0 . The derivation of (iii) is
straightforward from (A. 2b). To see that <£=0 => B L=0 , assume an equilibrium with
x=0=O but B
L
>0 . Then, by reducing B L , Congress will experience no reduction in x
and a welfare increase because of a budget reduction. (v) is derived directly from
Corollary 2
.
B. Proof of Proposition 2:
Assume that x° is the equilibrium regulatory effort. (B^,B°
L ) and T^ are spent to
achieve that outcome. We want to show that the expected total amount,
^(B$yr°L)+(l-^) (B°h+T°h ) , exceeds the minimum required to obtain x° , where the
probability function is evaluated at x° . The first order conditions to minimize
total expected expenditures subject to the individual rationality constraint and
x(B
L
,T 1 ,Bh ,Th )=x° are given by
(B.l) i-yx^-SWl - A\i = 0, CMBL B L = 0,
(B.2) ^- 7xT1 -60 - £
M
TL =0, £
M
nT L = 0,
< A 1 >
(B.3) (l-*)- 7x Bh -fi(W)W£ - f\h =0, /; MBhBh = 0,
(B.4) (W)- 7xTh-S(W) - £ MTh = 0, CMThTh = 0;
where 5 (7) is Che lagrange multiplier associated with the individual rationality
(constant effort level) constraint. Observe first that WB=1 is a solution to this
problem. Since xTh<0 and l/U^Kl/W^l, we obtain that Th=0 . From (B.2) we obtain
that 5=1+70 ' /(<^WXX ) , which after some substitutions implies
Wg='l<WlB=(l-0)/(l-0+7<j!i' /(0Wxx) ) • Thus, to achieve x° at minimum cost, compensations
should make the regulator's rate of substitution between money and budget equal to
one in low price states, but larger than one in high price states. Since this
allocation differs from the equilibrium one, the latter is not a cost minimizing
solution.
B. Proof of Proposition 4:
Let SR={x,Bh ,B L |^(x) [U 1 -B 1 ] + (l-^(x) ) [
U
h -
B
h ] >EU
R
* } , where EUR* represents the
equilibrium expected utility level for Congress in the restricted game. SR
represents the set of points in (x,Bh ,B L ) that provide Congress with a level of
expected utility that equals at least that achieved in the restricted game. Call
XR={x, Bh ,B L |x=x(Bh , B 1 ,Th=0) } where the function x( . ) is derived from the first
order condition for the regulator. From assumptions (Al)-(A5) and the definition
of equilibrium to the restricted game, XRnS R consists of the restricted equilibrium
values for (x,Bh ,B L ), and is unique. Let Xu={x, Bh , B L | x=x(Bh , B L , Th=T^ *) } , where
T^* is the equilibrium industry transfer in the unrestricted game. Since from the
first order condition for the regulator we know that x(Bh ,
B
L
,
T
h=T" *) <
x(Bh , B L ,Th-0) , then XunSR is empty. Thus, the unrestricted equilibrium cannot
provide Congress with a utility level in excess of EUR*
.
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